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I. INTRODUCTION
The language of the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution' and
antitrust laws that prohibit monopolies and restraints of trade2 may seem
contradictory. While the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to grant
monopolies to authors as an incentive to create, the antitrust laws reflect a
policy against monopolies. However, despite their apparent differences, the
two bodies of law work together to encourage innovation, industry, and
competition.
3
Competition and copyrights have long been recognized as a potential
source of antitrust violations. Antitrust problems can arise in the case of
copyright acquisition, licensing, and enforcement. The Supreme Court has
stated that "the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix
prices among themselves or otherwise to violate antitrust laws."4 In Data
General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,5 the First Circuit Court
stated that "[a]lthough creation and protection of original works of
authorship may be a national pastime, the [Sherman Antitrust Act
(Sherman Act)] does not explicitly exempt such activity from antitrust
scrutiny and courts should be wary of creating implied exemptions. 6 The
Supreme Court has also stated that the "neither the Sherman Act nor the
Copyright Act works as a partial repeal of the other."7 Thus, the two laws
must be harmonized.
Attempts at harmonizing the two laws have been concentrated in the
areas of refusal to license copyrighted material and blanket licensing of
copyrighted music. The greatest area of concern is blanket licensing of
copyrighted nondramatic music. Blanket licenses give licensees the right to
perform any and all of the compositions owned by a particular performance
rights society (PRS). The practice of issuing blanket licenses for a fee has
come under fire as price fixing, which is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.8
In 1995, Congress passed the Digital Performance Rights in Sound
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Copyright Clause).
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1998). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several [sitates, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
3. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
4. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
5. 36F.3d 1147, 1185 (lst Cir. 1994).
6. Id.
7. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
8. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (addressing whether blanket
license issued to television networks is a form of price fixing).
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Recordings Act (DPRSRA)9 in an effort to deal with the licensing problems
associated with nondramatic musical works. The DPRSRA created a right
in sound recordings to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of
a digital audio transmission, as well as established a compulsory licensing
scheme.'0 However, the DPRSRA fails to address the problem of licensing
of nondramatic works in foreign markets.
Currently, in many foreign markets, regulation permit the network to
broadcast nondramatic musical works, such as music videos, only if the
network has a license for the right to perform the video-the public
performance right.1H Typically, the music company or the various PRSs
hold this right.'2 In many cases, the music companies control the various
PRSs. In order to broadcast in many foreign countries, U.S. music
programming services must pay a blanket-licensing fee to the PRS of the
country in which they wish to broadcast. Because of the control by music
companies, the practice in foreign countries has been subject to accusations
of price fixing and restraint of trade. In the United States, DPRSRA
exempts noninteractive, nonsubscription services (networks supported by
advertisement), 4 which eliminates the potential for alleging Sherman Act
violations.
This Note advocates extending the DPRSRA to foreign markets. Part
II of this Note gives an overview of the development of sound recordings
protection by the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) 5 and the DPRSRA. It
further discusses the nature of antitrust and its application to the blanket
licensing of sound recordings. Part III reports the status of PRSs in foreign
countries and the possible violations of antitrust law. Part IV summarizes
how courts have interpreted and applied antitrust law to copyright. Part V
poses challenges and discusses the concerns that have arisen in light of the
new legislation.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. m 1997).
10. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(6) (West 1999). The DPRSRA added to the Copyright Act
the exclusive right of digital performance and a variety of exemptions.
11. See United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL
118413, *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
12. See id.
13. Seeid.at*l,*4.
14. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(d)(1) (West 1998).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541-2598 (1976).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings
Congress passed the first federal copyright act in 1790.16 This statute
provided a foundation for the current act, granting to authors and their
assigns the rights to maps, charts, and books for two fourteen-year terms.1
7
This statute essentially defined what Congress deemed to fall within the
constitutional meaning of a "writing." As technology advanced, the list of
what constituted a "writing" for purposes of copyright expanded. In 1802,
Congress amended the Act in order to grant protection to any person
"[w]ho shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work .. any historical or
other print or prints .... Congress further expanded the statute in 1831
to include musical compositions,9 and in 1865, Congress added
photographs and photographic negatives to the list of protected works.2
Congress again, in 1870, updated the copyright statute to include paintings,
• • 21
drawings, statuettes, statuary, and models or designs of fine art. The
authors obtained statutory rights to control distribution, display, and
reproduction of these "writings."22
The statutory right of exclusive public performance did not exist until
1897. Congress designed this exclusive performance right specifically for
dramatic and musical compositions, which were considered "writings" and
therefore protected by the copyright statute. Initially, Congress extended
the performance right only to the current subject matter covered in the
copyright statute. z
It was not until 1973 that sound recordings became the subject matter
of copyright and were considered "writings" under the Copyright Act.z In
1973, the Supreme Court recognized the federal government's
constitutional authority to regulate sound recordings, stating that it is
within Congress's power to decide whether a "particular category of
'writing[s]' is worthy of national protection. 2 The Court in Goldstein v.
16. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
17. See id.
18. Copyright Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed 1831).
19. See Copyright Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436.
20. See Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat 540.
21. See Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
22. See id.
23. See Copyright Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4,29 Stat. 481.
24. See id.
25. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,576 (1973).
26. Id at 559.
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California 7 did not address the specific rights that Congress endowed on
the authors of sound recordings, and the performance right in sound
recordings did not enter the debate.28 The seeming denial of the
performance right by Congress created disarray in state courts as well as in
the circuits." In an effort to respond to these problems, Congress amended
the Copyright Act to create a limited copyright in sound recordings."
However, Congress limited the amendment to prevent duplication of sound
recordings but did not include the performance right.
The right of public performance for musical works, particularly sound
recordings, continued to be a pressing issue in the 1976 Act."' The 1976
Act changed the copyright protection of sound recordings, granting the
sound recordings' copyright holder limited rights. This included the right
to prevent unauthorized duplication, distribution, and creation of derivative
works, while explicitly denying a grant of a performance right in section
32114(a). However, through section 114(d), Congress acknowledged the
potential for a right of performance in sound recordings.33 Section 114(d)
required the Register of Copyrights to submit a report to Congress
evaluating the adoption of a performance right in sound recordings.3 The
Register submitted a report in 1978, recommending that "section 114 be
amended to provide performance rights, subject to compulsory licensing, in
copyrighted sound recordings, and that the benefits of this right be
extended both to performers (including employers for hire) and to record
producers as joint authors of sound recordings."35
B. The Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of
1995
In 1995, Congress enacted the recommendation submitted by the
Registrar as the DPRSRA. The 1976 Act, as amended by DPRSRA,
provides the creator of an original work, including owners of copyrights in
27. 412 U.S. 546.
28. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546.
29. For a clear understanding of the progression of state law protecting sound
recordings performance rights, see Jonathon Franklin, Pay to Play: Enacting a Performance
Right in Sound Recording in the Age of Digital Audio Broadcasting, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REv. 83, 89 (1993).
30. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,85 Stat. 391 (amended by Pub. L. No. 93.
573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
31. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1998).
32. See id. §§ 106(4), 114(a) (West 1999). See Franklin, supra note 29, at 83.
33. See id, § 114(d).
34. See id
35. Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,766 (1978).
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sound recordings, with exclusive rights. Under the 1976 Act, authors may
stop others from copying, distributing, publicly displaying, or making
derivative works based on an author's protected work.36 In addition, the
DPRSRA added a new subsection 6 to section 106 of the Copyright Act
that created a new exclusive right-the digital performance right. Section
106(6) clearly states that the owner of the copyright under this title has the
exclusive right in the sound recordings, which allows the owner to perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
37
Basically, DPRSRA prohibits the unlicensed digital transmissions of sound
recordings.
The DPRSRA subjected the limited right to performance to certain
exclusions contained in section 114(d). 3 Section 114(d)(1) establishes a
primary exemption for noninteractive, nonsubscription services.' This
exemption allows broadcasters of free' ° (network) radio and television
programming to continue to perform sound recordings without a license. In
addition, various secondary transmissions of primary transmissions are
exempt under this section.
41
Section 114(d)(2)(e) addresses licensing to digital transmission
service providers who offer noninteractive programming on a subscription
basis. This section creates a compulsory licensing scheme and a voluntary
negotiation scheme of licensing between representatives of various PRSs
and transmitting entities.43 As per sections 1 14(d)(2)(e) and (f), PRSs and
transmitting entities must determine reasonable royalty rates for the
licensing of the performance rights of sound recordings.
The DPRSRA adds another facet to copyright antitrust. The statute
creates compulsory licensing and requires arbitration to settle disputes over
licensing. In conjunction with the common law, the DPRSRA creates a
domestic system that eliminates some of the problems that existed when
the PRSs operated strictly under consent decrees. First, the DPRSRA
authorizes the use of per program licensing. Second, the DPRSRA
eliminates complete control of licensing by requiring arbitration. Third,
DPRSRA protection under the Copyright Act only secures rights for those
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
37. See id. §106(6).
38. See id. § 114(d).
39. Seeid. § 114(d)(1).
40. "Free" in section 114 means broadcasters who support their network through
advertisements. See id § 114(d).
41. See id § 114(d).
42. See id § 114(d)(2)(e).
43. See United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL
118413, *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
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societies that do not hold exclusive rights. In United States v. Time Warner,
Inc.,4 the court authorized investigations of possible violations of antitrust
laws by PRSs in foreign markets and premised its decision on the facet
added to copyright antitrust by the DPRSRA.45
C. Performance Rights Societies
For the majority of copyrighted musical works in the United States, the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMT) license the public performing rights46
Copyright owners assign the PRSs, typically ASCAP or BMI, the right to
license nondramatic public performances of their musical compositions. The
PRSs then issue blanket licenses granting the right to perform any and all
works in the societies' repertories. The fees for blanket licenses are
ordinarily a percentage of the total of revenues or a flat dollar amount and
are not directly dependent on the amount or type of music used.47
The effect of copyright owners' conveyance of their rights to ASCAP
and BMI is the creation of a virtual monopoly over the licensing of musical
performance rights in this country. The monopoly power can be found in
the infringement action. The PRSs may institute suit against those who
infringe and enjoin them from interfering with the owner's exclusive
rights.41 Under the 1976 Act, those who publicly perform copyrighted
music have the burden of obtaining prior consent-a license.
ASCAP and BMI operations and licensing practices frequently have
been challenged under U.S. antitrust laws.50 Specifically, PRSs' practice of
issuing blanket licenses has been subject to charges that such practices
44. No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL 118413 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
45. See id.
46. The exclusive right to public performance is granted by the Copyright Act. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1999). ASCAP and BMI together handle the bulk of nondramatic
licensing transactions in this country. ASCAP, the larger of the two organizations, is an
unincorporated membership association consisting of approximately eight thousand music
publishing companies and 21,000 writers, composers and lyricists; it boasts a repertory of
over three million compositions. BMI is a nonprofit corporation affiliated with
approximately 22,000 publishers and 38,000 writers, with about one million compositions in
its repertory. See Buffalo Brdcst. Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
47. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
48. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 1999).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. 1I 1997).
50. See, e.g., United States v. American Soe'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
981 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. American Soe'y of Composers, Authors
& Publishers, 914 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Alden-Rochelle v. American Soe'y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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eliminate price competition between individual composers. These arguments
are based on the fact that licensees are entitled to perform any work in the
societies' repertories for a fee not based on actual use. Numerous
governmental and private antitrust actions have been brought against
ASCAP and BMI
Since 1941, consent decrees entered in litigation initiated by the
Department of Justice under the Sherman Act govern ASCAP and BMI.5'
The decrees resulted from an effort to reconcile the conflict between
copyright and antitrust law. The conflict stems from the U.S. Constitution,
which under the Copyright Clause permits Congress "[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited t]lines to
[a]uthors and [ilnventors the exclusive [right to their respective [w]ritings
and [d]iscoveries."52 The right conferred by the Constitution is a limited
monopoly. This is clearly in opposition to section 1 of the Sherman Act7
that seeks to prevent monopoly powers.54 Prior to the decrees, ASCAP and
BMI held exclusive performance rights to the compositions in their
repertory. Potential music users operating under the pre-1941 consent
decree system could not obtain a direct license from the original copyright
owner. This system forced users to obtain a blanket license on the PRSs'
terms. The nonexclusive licensing practice established by the consent
decree gives a licensee the opportunity to obtain the right from the PRSs or
from the original composer. The decree requires that ASCAP and BMI
offer a per-program licensing alternative to blanket licensing.' As a result,
both organizations are subject to substantial regulation that prohibits issuing
blanket licenses to certain groups of users, as well as providing individuals
-56the right to negotiate on a per-use basis. For example, in Buffalo
51. See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950-51
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950); United States v. American Soe'y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 156,104 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
1941). BMI is governed similarly by consent decrees. See United States v. Broadcast Music,
Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1966); United States v. Broadcast
Music, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,096 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 1941) (modified May
14, 1941).
52. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1998).
54. See W. Michael Garner, United States v. American Soc'y Composers, Authors &
Publishers: The Licensing Provisions of the Amended Final Judgement of 1950, 23 BULL.
CoPymIGHr Soc'Y 119, 120-21 (1975-76).
55. See United States v. American Soc'y of Authors, Composers & Publishers, 1950-51
Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 62,595, at 63,753 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14 1959).
56. See The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit in 1941 against ASCAP for
alleged antitrust violations. The parties settled and entered a consent decree that imposed
limitations on ASCAP's operation. See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers,
Authors & Publishers, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1941).
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Broadcasting Co. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, both organizations were enjoined from issuing blanket
performance licenses to local television broadcasters.
Internationally, the performance rights of U.S. music and music
videos (digital performances) are controlled by national PRSs, such as
Video Performance, Ltd. (VPL) in Britain, and umbrella international
copyright societies, such as the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (lFPI).! VPL and IFPI's practices are identical to those of ASCAP
and BvI and have been subjected to similar scrutiny. For instance, in United
States v. Time Warner, Inc., the court issued civil investigative demands
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act (ACPA).59 VPL and IFPI, controlled by
Time Warner, were targeted for investigation because of alleged "[riestraints
or monopolization of domestic and international markets for cable, wire[,]
and satellite-delivered music programming."'
VPL and IFPI have engaged in licensing that requires U.S. distributors
of digital music and music videos to purchase blanket licenses in order to
transmit on network stations in foreign countries.61 VPL and several other
PRSs in Europe have exclusive rights to their members' music and music
videos. This allows them to control and blanket licenses without allowing
individual negotiations between foreign record companies and music
programmers. This very practice is the source of antitrust litigation.
D. Antitrust as Traditionally Applied to Copyright Licensing
Antitrust laws are intended to protect the competitive process through
economic efficiency and competition.63 Antitrust laws are also geared
toward enhancing competition, rather than protecting competitors.6 The
doctrine of antitrust law rests on the principle that certain practices and
agreements in the marketplace are so plainly anticompetitive that those
practices are conclusively presumed illegal.65 Two sections of the Sherman
57. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
58. See United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL
118413 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
59. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §1312(1994).
60. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 118413, at *1. Unlike ASCAP and BMI, VPL and ]FPI
are not bound by the consent decrees.
61. See id,
62. See id.
63. See Allen Kezsbam & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The
Twisted Journey of the "Essential Facilities" Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. Rnv. 1, 2
(1996).
64. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,344 (1962).
65. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (West 1998).
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Act proscribe this anticompetitive conduct. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several [s]tates, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."''
Congress directed this section at restraints of trade that arise out of
contracts or other such combinations.67 In order to fall within section 1 of
the Sherman Act, there must be an agreement between two or more
persons. 68 Section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes liability for
anticompetitive practices.' 9 Section 2 holds individuals liable for
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize trade or commerce."
The issuing of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions
by PRSs has been the target of antitrust litigation. Specifically, the antitrust
litigation has targeted the following practices of the PRSs: assigning
licensees the rights, for a stated term, to perform any and all compositions
owned by the agencies' members or affiliates; charging fees, ordinarily
amounting to a percentage of total revenues or a flat dollar amount; and
failing to establish fees that are directly dependent on the amount or type of
music used.7' The litigation surrounding these issues raises the question of
whether these practices rise to the level of price fixing, which is per se
unlawful under the antitrust laws.72
The antitrust issue with regard to sound recordings and blanket
licensing arises in the context of broadcast in foreign markets. In order to
broadcast any music videos outside of the United States, music
programming services must pay a blanket licensing fee to the national PRS
of the country in which the network wishes to broadcast the music videos.73
These PRSs are alleged to impede U.S. exporters of music videos and
66. Id.
67. See id. ("Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
68. See id.
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The full text of section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
70. See id
71. See United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL
118413, *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
72. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
73. See Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 118413, at *1.
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original nonmusic programming from entering foreign markets 74
Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA),
75
conduct is exempt from the Sherman Act if it does not have a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce. 76 It is
plausible that even if the PRSs operate as price-fixing cartels, the antitrust
laws cannot be extended to include the actions of foreign entities. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have jurisdiction to investigate this
conduct because VPI and IFPI's conduct abroad produces merely
"ordinary" export effects. This argument is grounded in a reference in the
House Report on the FTAIA: "a price-fixing conspiracy directed solely to
exported products or services, absent a spillover effect on the domestic
marketplace... would normally not have the requisite effects on domestic
or import commerce."77 In this context, "normally" refers to the "ordinary"
effects of price-fixing, and, accordingly, the FTAIA confers jurisdiction
over foreign price-fixing only in the exceptional case when there is a
"spillover effect" in domestic markets."
I. UNITED STATES V. TIME WARNER, INC.
The exclusivity of the rights held by PRSs engaging in the blanket
licensing of music and music videos in foreign markets must undergo
restructuring in order to escape antitrust actions and possible violations.
The practice of holding exclusive rights in performance rights has been a
major ordeal for VPL and IFPI in antitrust investigations. Currently, VPL
and IFPI hold the exclusive rights of member composers of music and
music videos. In holding these rights, VPL and IFPI are able to force those
74. See id. at *2.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994). The provisions of FTAIA read as follows:
Sections I to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of
this title, other than this section.
If sections I to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation
of paragraph (1)(B), then sections I to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct
only for injury to export business in the United States.
Id.
76. Id.
77. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982).
78. See id.
79. See il
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companies engaging in the broadcast of music and music videos to
purchase the performance rights on their terms and are able to exclude any
individual from negotiating with the actual composer for use of the
protected work.
The practices of VPL and IFPI are identical to ASCAP and BMI prior
to the 1941 consent decrees. 0 As a result of their practices, VPL and IFPI's
operation have come under scrutiny because of the exclusivity of the rights
held. In United States v. Time Warner, Inc.,8' the DOJ sought to investigate
whether the practice of VPL and IFPI violates the Sherman Act.
The PRSs claim that VPL and the other European PRSs in have been
restructured.82 Time Warner 3 stated in its claim that VPL has been
restructured "so that they no longer hold the exclusive rights to their
member's music and music videos," and that record companies in the
foreign market may negotiate individually with music programmers. 4 The
DOJ's major concern is the permanence of the restructuring of VPL and
IFPI. The foreign PRSs are not bound by the consent decrees entered into
by domestic PRSs. Further, Congress's enactment of the DPRSRA only
created compulsory digital radio licensing system pursuant to which, in the
absence of an agreement between a licensor and licensee, licenses are set
by arbitration in domestic licensing. 5
Effectively, VPL and IFPI licensing practices are not subjected to
regulations under the current copyright law. Additionally, whether or not
the practice of holding exclusive rights to performance and blanket
licensing of these rights is a violation of the Sherman Act has never been
articulated by the courts." Time Warner contends that the antitrust laws are
not applicable to VPL and IFPI.87
The court in Time Warner, Inc. concluded that neither the plain
language of the FTAIA, which does not identify particular categories of
exempted conduct, nor its legislative history, considered in full, supports
Time Warner's argument about the restrictive scope of the FTAIA on the
80. See supra Part 1.C.
81. No. MISC.A.94-338(HHG), 1997 WL 118413 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997).
82. See id. at *Z
83. Time Warner is one of the major controllers of the international performance rights
societies VPL and IFPI.
84. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 118413, at *2.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. M 1997).
86. Before actually deciding whether the exclusive licensing practice was a violation of
the antitrust laws, ASCAP and the DOJ reached a settlement which included the 1941
consent decrees. The question of whether the exclusive licensing practice is a violation of
the antitrust law has not been litigated.
87. See Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 118413, at *3.
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practices of VPL and IFPI. The purportedly dispositive sentence about
"spillover" effects appears in a section of the legislative history referring to
the standing of injured foreign buyers, not injured U.S. exporters."
If such solely export-oriented conduct affects export commerce of
another person doing business in the United States... [jurisdiction is
preserved] insofar as there is injury to that person .... Thus a domestic
exporter... is assured a remedy under our antitrust laws for injury
caused by a competing United States exporter. But a foreign firm
whose non-domestic [sic] operations were [thus injured] ... would
have no remedy under our antitrust laws. 89
The court in Time Warner, Inc., concluded that the DOJ has jurisdiction
over possible violations of the Sherman Act and that VPL and ]FPI are
subject to those laws contained within the Acte9
The current organizational structure of VPL and IFPI are subject to
penalties for violation of the Sherman Act. Because there is no
jurisprudence on antitrust violations and PRSs that hold exclusive rights to
performance of the works in their repertory, it is unlikely that Time Warner
will continue to operate under the current structure. Since the court's
decision in Time Warner to enforce civil investigative demands against
Time Warner,9' it is evident that the status of VPL and IFPI, as well as
other foreign PRSs, will be evolving. The ultimate issue is permanency.
Without a consent decree, any changes in the current system of operation
are not binding for continuance of operations.
IV. CASE LAW ON ANTITRUST AND COPYRIGHT INVOLVING
U.S. PERFORMANCE RIGHTS SOCmTmS
Between 1934 and 1966, the government began efforts to restore
competition in copyright licensing. The grant of a monopoly by the U.S.
Constitution and the Copyright Act, which imposes penalties for
infringement of the protected rights, gave PRSs virtual control over the
market of performance of musical compositions.9 The DOJ initiated its
efforts to eliminate the market monopoly in United States v. American
Society of Composers, Authors and Producers.93
The DOJ filed suit against ASCAP alleging that its practices of
88. See id at * 4.
89. PHmiip E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAM, ANTIRUST LAW 337 (Supp. 1996)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10-11 (1982)).
90. See Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 118413, at *5.
91. Id. at*6.
92. See Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of
the Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8
FORDHAM MIrrL. PRop. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733,745 (1998).
93. 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 156,104 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1941).
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obtaining exclusive copyrights monopolized the performance rights market
for songs played on the radio.94 The DOJ also claimed that the blanket
license was an unlawful combination in restraint of trade.95 The resulting
decree changed the way ASCAP licensed its repertory.9
The first challenge to the market structure created by the PRSs was in
CBS v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Producers.97 This suit
attacked the flat fee imposed by the blanket licensing system as a violation
of both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.98 The district court rejected
CBS's claims, held that the claims were not substantiated, and denied all
relief sought.99 Subsequently, the appellate court reversed the district
court's decision and held that the blanket license has a direct effect on the
price.'00 The appellate court concluded that "[b]lanket license[s] ... reduce
price competition among the members [to the agreement] and provided a
disinclination to compete."' 0'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
blanket licensing constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
and remanded the case to be considered in light of the perimeters set forth
in the opinion.'12 0n remand, the appellate court upheld the blanket license
under the rule of reason.
103
Another case that challenged the blanket licensing practice of the
domestic PRSs was Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers.'04 Since this case followed the court
of appeals' decision in CBS holding that blanket licensing was a restraint
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See supra Part II.C.
97. 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1977), revd,
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
98. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 (West 1998). For more detailed analysis of CBS v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, see Hllman, supra note 92, at 747.
99. See CBS, 400 F. Supp. 737, rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1977), rev'd, Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The district court held that CBS failed to prove an
illegal combination designed to fix prices and failed to offer any evidence that the individual
composers acted in concert to restrain competition. The court continued its analysis by
defining the market that was alleged to have been restrained. See id.
100. See CBS, 562 F.2d 130, 140, rev'd, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
101. Id.
102. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. 1. A careful fact-sensitive balancing approach
of the rule of reason analysis should be used on remand. See id. at 24-25.
103. See CBS v. American Soe'y of Composers, Authors & Producers, 620 F.2d 930,
934 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
104. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'4 744 F.3d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
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on trade, Buffalo Broadcasting argued that the use of blanket licensing had
restrained trade in the local television market.05 Once this case made it to
trial, the Supreme Court had reversed the court of appeals' decision in
CBS. The court in Buffalo Broadcasting Co. applied the rule of reason and,
like the appellate court in CBS on remand, held that there was no violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 10
The copyrightlantitrust case law dealing with U.S. PRSs suggests that
in the presence of a consent decree, the practice of blanket licensing does
not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. It is clear from both CBS and
Buffalo Broadcasting Co. that as long as the domestic PRSs are operating
in accordance with the consent decree, no violation will be found. The
courts in the aforementioned case have defined the potential market that
PRS's control very broadly. By applying the "rule of reason," the courts
have decided that there is no "realistically available" alternative and that,
on balance, the beneficial effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
V. CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES
The anticompetitive effects that have arisen in the realm of the
control of performance rights by foreign PRSs have caused great concerns
for U.S. companies that are in the business of broadcasting music and
videos in foreign markets. The major concern is that the PRSs are using the
international copyright laws of each individual country to strong-arm the
purchase of a blanket license. The international laws, particularly the Rome
Convention,'7 include the protection of performance rights in sound
recordings. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works 1* only protected literary and artistic works. These works
did not include sound recordings. The Rome Convention allowed
105. See id. at 276.
106. See Buffalo Brdest. Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
744 F.2d 917, 925-26 (2nd Cir. 1984). The court used the two prong test that was devised in
CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers. The prongs of the test were:
(1) whether the blanket license restrained competition because there was no realistic
alternative available and (2) if there was no alternative, balance whether the anticompetitive
effects of the blanket license system outweighed the beneficial or procompetitive effects.
See id. at 926.
107. See World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,36 LL.M. 76 (1997).
108. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, art. 5, para. I, reprinted in Mavu.n B. NnvMR & DAviD NMMER, NniwmR ON
COPYRIGHT app. 27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also Georges Koumantos, The
Future of the Berne Convention, I I CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 225, 229 (1986). The Berne
Convention forms the basis of copyright protection in countries such as England, France,
and Germany. All technologically advanced countries have adopted the Berne Convention,
except the Soviet Union and China. See id.
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protection for "other works," which included sound recordings. Because of
the protection allowed, it is requisite that broadcasters of sound recordings
receive licensing to broadcast the recordings.
9
The PRSs in each of the prospective countries use their intellectual
property laws to require the purchase. U.S. companies have no alternative.
They must purchase blanket licenses from the PRSs. These societies, as
currently structured, hold the exclusive rights to performance and
negotiations with individual composers and record companies, where
foreign companies are prohibited.1
The challenge now faced by foreign PRSs is compliance with U.S.
antitrust laws and avoiding both the penalties under the Sherman Act and
possible injunctions that would be initiated under the Clayton Act."' To
face the challenge, VPL and IFPI models of assigning licenses should
mirror that of the domestic PRSs, as well as following the guidelines
specified in the newly enacted DPRSRA. The courts have established that
in the absence of exclusive rights, PRSs are the most efficient means to
monitor and police composers' rights under the Copyright Act. Further, the
courts have held that the scheme of blanket licensing when viewed in
conjunction with the consent decrees is not a per se restraint of trade.
Similarly, the Copyright Act now protects the endeavors of the PRSs, as
well as providing means to ensure competition within the limited
monopoly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the protection of sound recordings both on a national
and international level proved to be a compromise. Sound recordings were
not protected in the original Copyright Act nor were they protected by the
Berne Convention. After many compromises, a revised Copyright Act, and
another international convention, sound recordings are protected. Similarly,
the protection of performance rights in sound recordings was long and
finally forthcoming in the DPRSRA. The protection of performance rights
and the policing efforts have been undertaken by PRSs who initially
controlled the market. Domestically, the fear of violating the antitrust laws
and the severe punishment that accompanies such violations persuaded
PRSs to consent to only possessing nonexclusive rights.
109. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the evolution of protection of sound recordings in
the United States).
110. Because the performance rights societies have been assigned the exclusive rights,
negotiations with the composers or record companies would be an infringement on the
performance rights and subjected to penalties under the laws of each country.
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 12(1994).
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On the international level, there are no consent decrees and the
possibilities of antitrust violations are inherent. After the decision in Time
Warner, the controllers of PRSs must restructure or face the consequences.
The best solution to the problem is to extend the guidelines found in the
DPRSRA to the operations of foreign PRSs. This approach would
eliminate the market monopoly and bring the PRSs in accord with antitrust
laws.

